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Bill’s home sits high in the mountains of northern Idaho. In the 
summertime, he likes to watch deer scamper around his backyard while he 
sips hot coffee and reads the local newspaper. Bill, however, spends more 
mornings in Alaska than in Idaho. His chain of popular restaurants, 
Buffalo Bill’s, has locations in many Alaskan cities. The success of Bill’s 
business, particularly its “famous” Wild West Buffalo Burger, has allowed 
the Idahoan to build a restaurant empire throughout Alaska. 
Bill pays his fair share in Alaska state taxes, and his restaurants 
employ hundreds of waiters, bussers, managers, cooks, and dishwashers 
across the state. To protect and promote his business interests in Alaska, 
Bill spends more than half of the year traveling throughout the state, 
strengthening his relationships with the locals and their elected leaders. 
Because Bill resides in Idaho, however, he cannot vote in any Alaskan 
elections. He supports his favorite candidates when he can, but his busy 
schedule limits the amount of time he can devote to campaigning personally 
for any one candidate. The most effective, efficient, and meaningful way 
Bill can support candidates is through monetary contributions. 
Bill can make campaign contributions to candidates for state office in 
nearly every state in the nation to the same extent as residents in those 
states.1 In Alaska, however, Bill has a problem. Alaska is one of two states 
that place special limitations on the ability of out-of-state residents to 
donate money to candidates seeking in-state office.2 Alaska’s law limits 
Bill’s ability to donate in a state where his business creates hundreds of 
jobs, leads to millions of dollars in state tax revenue, and regularly fills the 
bellies of Alaskans with thick, juicy burgers. In today’s highly mobile 
society, many Americans just like Bill have significant interests in states 
other than the ones in which they legally reside. Potential cross-border 
concerns range from those of parents with children in other states to 
coastal residents worried about state environmental policies that could 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2018, by BEN WALLACE. 
 1. See State Limits on Contributions to Candidates, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEG., http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/elect/ContributionLimits 
toCandidates2015-2016.pdf (last updated May 2016) (providing a chart comparing 
laws that limit individual contributions in every state) [https://perma.cc/TT85-
RTBC]. 
 2. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072 (2017) (capping the amount of contributions 
candidates may receive from nonresidents—for example, $20,000 for gubernatorial 
candidates and $5,000 for state senatorial candidates); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 
11-362 (2017) (prohibiting Hawaiian candidates from collecting more than 30% of 
total contributions from nonresidents).  




affect their homes. In such high-stakes matters, special limits placed on 
the rights of Americans to associate with candidates in other states create 
troubling First Amendment concerns.3  
The First Amendment prohibits governments from “abridging the 
freedom of speech.”4 Though originally applicable only to Congress,5 the 
First Amendment has long been held to apply to state and municipal 
governments through the application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.6 In addition, the term “speech” within the First Amendment 
has been interpreted to include a wide variety of other activities, such as rights 
of political expression and association.7 Making campaign contributions 
involves the exercise of both rights.8 Courts are split on whether state 
nonresident political contribution limits violate the First Amendment, which 
                                                                                                             
 3. This Comment focuses on how such limits interfere with First 
Amendment rights. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”). It is entirely possible—and perhaps even 
likely—that such laws also infringe upon other constitutional provisions such as 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the 
Equal Protection Clause. See Mitchell L. Pearl & Mark Lopez, Against Act 64: 
Preserving Political Freedom for the Candidate and the Citizen, Brief for the 
Appellants in Landell v. Sorrell, 27 VT. L. REV. 721 (2003) (discussing how 
Vermont’s law limiting nonresident contributions in state elections likely violates 
all three constitutional provisions). One intriguing question is whether the multiple 
constitutional protections combined could invalidate laws limiting nonresident 
contributions, even if no single constitutional protection clearly prohibits such laws. 
See Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 
(2016) (showing the history of the Supreme Court’s willingness to entertain such 
arguments). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 5. This was true for the entire Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the 
United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.  
 6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law . . . .”); see also Gitlow 
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (extending application of the First 
Amendment to the state governments); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 
742, 761 (2010) (citing Gitlow for the proposition that the First Amendment falls 
within the Bill of Rights protections incorporated by the Due Process Clause). 
 7. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014) 
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)). 
 8. Id. (“When an individual contributes money to a candidate, he exercises 
both of those rights: The contribution ‘serves as a general expression of support for 
the candidate and his views’ and ‘serves to affiliate a person with a candidate.’” 
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21–22)). 




has created a hole in First Amendment campaign finance jurisprudence.9 To 
fill this gap in the law, provide clear guidance for legislators, and protect the 
political association rights of nonresidents, the United States Supreme Court 
should, at its next opportunity, invalidate state nonresident contribution limits. 
Recent Court rulings dictate the direction it should take.10 Nonresidents 
without voting power should possess the ability to donate to political 
campaigns to the same extent as residents as a means of protecting legitimate 
interests. No one would seriously contest Bill’s right to campaign voluntarily 
on behalf of a candidate for governor in Alaska by, for example, knocking 
on doors or passing out flyers. But because such activity is impractical for 
people like Bill, nonresident contribution limits effectively restrict their 
ability to participate in state elections in which they have legitimate 
interests. 
Part I of this Comment introduces federal campaign finance regulation 
before summarizing Buckley v. Valeo,11 the root from which all subsequent 
campaign finance jurisprudence sprouted. Next, Part II presents a holistic 
overview of state nonresident contribution limits caselaw and then 
inspects recent Supreme Court decisions that altered the campaign finance 
jurisprudential landscape within the context of the First Amendment. In 
Part III, this Comment analyzes the constitutionality of nonresident 
contribution limits, weaving in policy reasons supporting the invalidation of 
such laws. Finally, Part IV examines the extent to which states should have 
the power to restrict any political activity to their own residents without 
violating the First Amendment.  
I. TRACING THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 
Federal lawmakers began policing money’s role in politics more than 
a century ago.12 Since then, many ambitious politicians have introduced 
                                                                                                             
 9. Compare State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 617 (Alaska 
1999) (upholding Alaska nonresident contribution limits), with VanNatta v. Keisling, 
151 F.3d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1998) (invalidating Oregon nonresident contribution 
limits); Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 146 (2d Cir. 2004) (invalidating Vermont 
nonresident contribution limits), rev’d in part sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 
230 (2006) (reversing the Second Circuit on other grounds). 
 10. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010) (expanding, in general, the First Amendment’s protection of political 
association rights); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (creating an especially high First 
Amendment hurdle for contribution limits in general).  
 11. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1. 
 12. R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41542, THE STATE OF 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 




legislative proposals seeking to restrict the potentially corrupting influence 
of money in elections.13 But the suggestions have rarely resulted in major 
legislative change.14 The methods of regulation have remained remarkably 
consistent: restricting potential funding sources, requiring the disclosure 
of permissible funding sources, and limiting campaign contributions.15 
The efforts, however, have proven mostly ineffective.16  
A. The Federal Election Campaign Act 
Understanding modern campaign finance reform requires an introduction 
to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”).17 Though the initial 
Act focused mostly on disclosure requirements and hardly resembled the 
law’s present form,18 the Act and its subsequent amendments still serve as 
the federal government’s central campaign finance legislation.19 In 1974, 
prompted in part by the Watergate scandal,20 Congress passed the first of 
                                                                                                             
(2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41542.pdf (providing the history of 
federal involvement in campaign finance beginning with the 1907 Tillman Act, which 
prohibited federal contributions from nationally chartered banks and corporations) 
[https://perma.cc/JX2P-6FYB]. 
 13. Id. at 2. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1. 
 16. See Michael A. Nemeroff, The Limited Role of Campaign Finance Laws 
in Reducing Corruption by Elected Public Officials, 49 HOW. L.J. 687, 695 (2006) 
(“Campaign finance laws do not appear to have much impact on the public’s 
perception of corruption of the political process. Similarly, these laws also appear 
to have little impact on election outcomes.”). 
 17. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 
(1972) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30145 (2012)). 
 18. See id.; see also GARRETT, supra note 12, at 3. 
 19. See GARRETT, supra note 12, at 3 (explaining that FECA “remains the 
foundation of the nation’s campaign finance law”). 
 20. See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences 
of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1055 (1996) (explaining how 
public response to the Watergate scandal led Congress to pass the 1974 FECA 
amendments, “the toughest and most thorough federal campaign-regulation measures 
ever passed”). The Watergate scandal refers to former President Richard Nixon’s 
involvement in a massive scheme of promised political favors and spying funded in 
part by a secret campaign slush fund. See generally Carl Bernstein & Bob 
Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aids Sabotaged Democrats, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 
1972), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-finds-nixon-aides-sabotaged-
democrats/2012/06/06/gJQAoHIJJV_story.html [https://perma.cc /7R4W-F2LU]. 




several amendments to FECA.21 Changes included new provisions 
limiting the amount of money that individuals,22 corporations,23 and 
political committees24 could give directly to candidates for federal 
office—referred to generally as contribution limits.25 The new provisions 
also placed limits on the amount of money individuals and other groups 
could spend advocating for a particular candidate—referred to generally 
as expenditure limits.26 In sum, a contribution involves giving money to a 
candidate. An expenditure involves spending money on behalf of a 
candidate. 
The early FECA amendments distinguished expenditures made in 
coordination with a particular candidate from so-called “independent 
expenditures.”27 Independent expenditures involve spending that expressly 
endorses or rejects a particular candidate without the involvement of 
candidates or their campaigns in the production of such messages.28 
Candidates and their campaign teams have considerable freedom to spend 
                                                                                                             
 21. See GARRETT, supra note 12, at 3 (explaining how FECA was first 
enacted in 1971 and “substantially amended” in 1974, 1976, and 1979). 
 22. See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a) (2012) (placing certain limits on the amount of 
money individuals may contribute to candidates for federal office). 
 23. See id. § 30118 (prohibiting corporations and unions from directly 
contributing to federal election campaigns). 
 24. See § 30116(a)(2) (limiting the amount of money political committees 
may contribute to federal candidates and other political committees); see also id. 
§ 30101(4) (providing a statutory definition for “political committee”).  
 25. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: The distinction between 
contribution limits and expenditure limits, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 12, 2013, 2:42 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/symposium-the-distinction-between-
contribution-limits-and-expenditure-limits/ (defining contribution limits as 
“restrictions on the amount that a person can give to a candidate or political 
committee”) [https://perma.cc/R2AW-NG2V]; see also § 30101(8)(A)–(B) 
(providing a statutory definition for “contribution”). 
 26. See Chemerinsky, supra note 25 (explaining that expenditure limits 
restrict how much money a person or group may spend on its own to promote a 
candidate or issue); see also § 30101(9)(A)–(B) (providing a statutory definition 
for “expenditure”). 
 27. See § 30101(17) (providing the statutory definition for “independent 
expenditure”). 
 28. See GARRETT, supra note 12, at 5–6, 5 n.21 (“Independent expenditures 
explicitly call for election or defeat of political candidates (known as express 
advocacy), may occur at any time, and are usually (but not always) broadcast 
advertisements. They must also be uncoordinated with the campaign in 
question.”) (citations omitted). 




“contributions” as they see fit,29 but candidates may not direct, coordinate, 
or participate in “independent expenditure” spending by groups that support 
them.30 The importance of the distinction between contributions and 
independent expenditures to today’s campaign finance regulatory landscape 
cannot be overstated. Contributions remain highly regulated across the 
country at the state31 and federal levels.32 Independent expenditures, however, 
exist largely unrestricted.33 
B. The Mother of All Campaign Finance Jurisprudence 
In 1976, the first major challenge to FECA and its early amendments 
reached the United States Supreme Court.34 Buckley v. Valeo involved First 
Amendment challenges to some of FECA’s contribution and independent 
expenditure limits.35 The contribution limits prohibited individuals from 
giving more than $1,000 in a single year to any candidate running for federal 
office.36 The independent expenditure limits prohibited individuals from 
spending more than $1,000 in a single year “relative to a clearly identified 
candidate.”37 The constitutional validity of both types of limits depended 
on whether the government had a compelling state interest to justify each 
provision’s interference with First Amendment rights of political expression 
and association.38  
                                                                                                             
 29. See 52 U.S.C. § 30114 (listing permissible and prohibited uses of 
campaign “contributions”). 
 30. See § 30101(17) (providing the statutory definition of an “independent 
expenditure”). 
 31. See generally 50 State Statutory Surveys: Election Law: Campaign Finance 
Reform, Limits on Individual Contributions to Candidates, Westlaw 0050 Surveys 
3 (2015). 
 32. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116–30118. 
 33. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) 
(invalidating federal law that prohibited corporations and unions from spending 
general treasury funds on certain independent expenditures); SpeechNow.org v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (invalidating federal laws 
that limited contributions to any group that made only independent expenditures). 
 34. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 35. See id. at 13–14. 
 36. See id. at 13. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. at 44–45 (explaining that the constitutionality of the expenditure 
limits depended on “whether the governmental interests advanced in its support 
satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment 
rights of political expression”).  




The Court in Buckley ultimately invalidated FECA’s ceilings on 
independent expenditures but upheld the law’s limits on contributions.39 
The Court held that both contribution and independent expenditure limits 
interfered with First Amendment rights, but contribution limits created 
“only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free 
communication.”40 Unlike contribution limits, independent expenditure 
limits represented “substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on 
the quantity and diversity of political speech.”41  
The Court’s reasoning can be explained as follows:42 a donor who 
spends money advocating on behalf of a candidate controls the message. 
That is, the donor making an expenditure can choose what the message 
says, who says it, where it is said, and how it is delivered. But donors who 
give money to a candidate do not control the message—the candidate 
controls the message. The message conveyed by a contribution lies in the 
mere act of giving itself. Because expenditures involve a more direct form 
of speech than contributions, expenditures deserve more protection under 
the First Amendment.43 
The Court’s distinction between contributions and independent 
expenditures—the latter receiving more constitutional protection than the 
former44—laid the foundation for the deregulation of independent 
expenditures.45 
Even more significant in Buckley was the Court’s recognition of 
FECA’s “primary purpose” as limiting “the actuality and appearance of 
                                                                                                             
 39. Id. at 58. 
 40. Id. at 20. 
 41. Id. at 19. 
 42. See id. at 19–21 (distinguishing the level of political speech involved in 
contributions from that in expenditures). 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. at 23. But see McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 
1434, 1448 (2014) (“[T]he First Amendment safeguards an individual’s right to 
participate in the public debate through political expression and political 
association. When an individual contributes money to a candidate, he exercises 
both of those rights: [t]he contribution ‘serves as a general expression of support 
for the candidate and his views’ and ‘serves to affiliate a person with a 
candidate.’”) (citations omitted) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15, 21–22) The 
court’s reasoning seems to indicate the distinction is not as black and white as it 
once was. See id. 
 45. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) 
(invalidating laws that limit independent expenditures); SpeechNow.org v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (invalidating federal laws 
that limited contributions to political committees that made only independent 
expenditures and not contributions). 




corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions.”46 The 
Court held that the government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo 
corruption,47 or its appearance, sufficiently justified FECA’s contribution 
limits but not the law’s independent expenditure limits.48 Although later 
courts relied on this language to find that preventing corruption was the 
only government interest that could justify speech-infringing campaign 
finance restrictions,49 the Court in Buckley actually qualified the anti-
corruption interest within the broader goal of “safeguarding the integrity 
of the electoral process.”50 Regardless, the opinion stands for the principle 
that only preventing corruption can justify First Amendment interference 
created by campaign finance laws. 
II. SETTING THE STAGE: A STATE-CIRCUIT SPLIT PUNCTUATED BY A 
FRESH TAKE ON MONEY IN POLITICS AT THE SUPREME COURT  
The substantial early amendments to FECA that created campaign 
contribution and expenditure limits prompted states across the country to 
adopt similar laws.51 It was not until nearly 20 years after Buckley, however, 
that a few states began experimenting with nonresident contribution limits.52 
In every state that has implemented nonresident contribution limits, the 
                                                                                                             
 46. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. 
 47. See, e.g., id. at 26–27 (“To the extent that large contributions are given to 
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the 
integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.”); see also 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (defining “quid pro quo corruption” as “the 
notion of a direct exchange of an official act for money”); Citizens United, 558 
U.S. at 360 (explaining that “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption”). 
 48. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58. 
 49. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441–42 (explaining that campaign 
finance restrictions pursuing objectives other than preventing quid pro quo 
corruption or its appearance “impermissibly inject the Government ‘into the 
debate over who should govern.’ And those who govern should be the last people 
to help decide who should govern.” (quoting Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 750 (2011))). 
 50. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58. 
 51. See Anthony J. Gaughan, The Futility of Contribution Limits in the Age 
of Super PACs, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 755, 764–65 (2012). 
 52. See, e.g., VanNatta v. Keisling, 899 F. Supp. 488, 491 (D. Or. 1995) 
(explaining that Oregon voters passed “Measure 6,” the constitutional amendment 
containing the nonresident contribution limits, in November 1994), aff’d, 151 
F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 
600 (Alaska 1999) (explaining that the Alaska legislature created its nonresident 
contribution limits in 1996). 




laws operate in a similar way. First, the laws do not regulate out-of-state 
residents directly but instead indirectly regulate them by placing limits on 
the amount of money in-state candidates can accept from out-of-state 
residents.53 Second, although the laws do not bar out-of-state contributions 
entirely, the laws create ceilings on nonresident campaign contributions.54 
These restrictions effectively bar contributions once a certain threshold—
either a specified amount or a percentage of total donations, depending on 
the state law—is met.55 
For example, consider Bill, the restaurant entrepreneur. Alaska’s law 
does not completely prohibit him or other nonresidents from contributing 
money to an Alaskan gubernatorial candidate’s campaign.56 But once a 
particular gubernatorial candidate accepts $20,000 from nonresidents in a 
given year, Alaska’s law prohibits the candidate from collecting a single 
dollar from Bill or any other nonresident for the remainder of the year.57 
Although such laws avoid the jurisdictional and sovereignty issues created 
by directly regulating nonresidents, nonresident contribution limits create 
serious First Amendment concerns.58 
                                                                                                             
 53. See OR. CONST. art. II, § 22 (effectively prohibiting candidates from 
collecting more than ten percent of their contributions from out-of-district 
residents), invalidated by VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998); 
ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072 (2017) (capping the amount of contributions candidates 
may receive from nonresidents—for example, $20,000 for gubernatorial candidates 
and $5,000 for state senatorial candidates); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805 (repealed 
2014) (prohibiting candidates from collecting more than 25% of total campaign 
contributions from out-of-state residents); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-362 (2017) 
(prohibiting candidates from collecting more than 30% of total contributions from 
nonresidents).  
 54. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 55. Compare § 15.13.072 (prohibiting candidates from collecting contributions 
from nonresidents once candidates have collected a specified value of dollars from 
them), with HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-362 (prohibiting candidates from collecting 
contributions from nonresidents once a certain percentage of their total 
contributions consists of nonresident contributions). 
 56. See § 15.13.072. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See, e.g., VanNatta, 151 F.3d at 1218 (invalidating Oregon nonresident 
contribution limits on First Amendment grounds); Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 
98 (2d Cir. 2004) (invalidating Vermont nonresident contribution limits on First 
Amendment grounds), rev’d in part sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 
(2006) (reversing the Second Circuit on other grounds).  




A. Four States, Two Invalidated Laws 
Four states—Oregon, Alaska, Vermont, and Hawaii—have created 
nonresident contribution limits.59 In each state, lawmakers sought to prevent 
outside interests from garnering outsized influence in local elections.60 
Though often popular among residents and their elected representatives,61 
the laws in three of the four states—Hawaii excluded—have been 
challenged on First Amendment grounds.  
1. Pioneers in Oregon Halted  
The first state nonresident contribution limits were created by voters, 
not legislators.62 In 1994, Oregon voters passed a constitutional amendment 
effectively prohibiting candidates from collecting more than ten percent of 
their campaign contributions from people who resided outside of their 
election districts.63 The measure was intended to prevent outsiders from 
“buying influence in elections” and to allow “ordinary people” to control 
                                                                                                             
 59. See supra text accompanying note 53. In addition, one Ohio city 
implemented a nonresident contribution limit for local elections that a federal 
district judge found “so clearly unconstitutional” that the law did not merit much 
discussion outside of one footnote. See Frank v. City of Akron, 95 F. Supp. 706, 
708 n.3 (N.D. Ohio 1999), rev’d in part, 290 F.3d 813 (6th Cir. 2002) (reversing in 
part on other grounds without addressing Akron’s nonresident contribution limits). 
 60. See, e.g., VanNatta v. Keisling, 899 F. Supp. 488, 491 (D. Or. 1995) 
(identifying the purpose of Oregon’s law), aff’d, 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998); 
State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 617 (Alaska 1999) (identifying 
the purpose of Alaska’s law); Landell, 382 F.3d at 99–102 (identifying some of the 
purposes of Vermont’s law); J. 23-185, Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2005) (Conf. Rep.), 
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2005/commreports/HB1747_CD1_CCR185
_.htm (identifying the purpose of Hawaii’s law as to “ensure that elected officials 
are not disproportionately influenced by outside interests”) [https://perma.cc 
/T3AU-MP3L]. 
 61. See, e.g., Andrew Hyman, Comment, Alaska Gives Ninth Circuit the Cold 
Shoulder: Conflicts in Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1453, 1477–78, 1477 n.152 (2004) (noting the general popularity of statutes 
aimed at leveling the playing field); see also Landell, 382 F.3d at 100 (noting the 
“powerful support among the Vermont electorate for fundamental reform to the 
State’s campaign financing scheme”). 
 62. See VanNatta, 899 F. Supp. at 491 (explaining that Oregon voters passed 
“Measure 6,” the constitutional amendment containing the nonresident contribution 
limits, in November 1994), aff’d, 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 63. See OR. CONST. art. II, § 22, invalidated by VanNatta, 151 F.3d 1215. 




their own government.64 When challenged on First Amendment grounds, 
Oregon’s federal district court invalidated the measure.65  
The district court in VanNatta v. Keisling found that the law suffered 
from three flaws. First, the measure prevented the extent to which state 
residents could politically associate with candidates from other districts 
whose actions likely would affect residents of the entire state, not just the 
candidate’s constituents.66 Second, the measure did nothing to prevent in-
district donors from contributing large amounts of money that could 
corrupt the political process.67 Third, because the law’s restrictions were 
based on a percentage of total donations, it failed to eliminate large out-
of-district donations so long as a candidate could raise significant in-
district donations.68 Because the law failed to achieve its purpose—
preventing corruption—the court struck it down.69 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision.70 The 
Ninth Circuit essentially adopted the district court’s reasoning related to 
the law’s shortcomings in preventing corruption.71 The appellate court also 
rejected the separate state interest of preserving a republican form of 
government as insufficient to justify the law’s interference with the free 
association rights of nonresidents.72 The majority’s opinion recognized 
that “[t]he Supreme Court has suggested that states have a strong interest 
in ensuring that elected officials represent those who elect them,”73 but the 
majority distinguished Oregon’s law from two cases in which the United 
States Supreme Court recognized such an interest.74 Because the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in VanNatta,75 the Court effectively upheld the 
lower court decisions that found Oregon’s law unconstitutional on First 
Amendment grounds.  
                                                                                                             
 64. See VanNatta, 899 F. Supp. at 491. 
 65. See id. at 497. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 71. Id. at 1216–18. 
 72. See id. at 1217–18. 
 73. See id. at 1218. 
 74. See id. (distinguishing Oregon’s law from laws unrelated to campaign 
finance upheld by the Supreme Court in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 
439 U.S. 60 (1978), and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)). 
 75. Miller v. VanNatta, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999). 




2. Frontiersmen in Alaska Succeed 
While the constitutional challenge to Oregon’s law made its way 
through the appellate review process, Alaskans enacted their own 
nonresident contribution limits76 as part of broader campaign finance 
reform legislation.77 The stated legislative purpose of the reform was to 
“restore the public’s trust in the electoral process and to foster good 
government.”78 The legislation also was intended to address public 
concerns about “actual and apparent corruption in Alaska politics.”79 
Within months of the law’s passage, the Alaska Civil Liberties Union 
challenged the law on First Amendment grounds.80 
Alaska’s Supreme Court took a much different approach to Alaska’s 
nonresident contribution limits than the Ninth Circuit did to Oregon’s law. 
The court in State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union held that Alaska’s 
nonresident contribution limits did not violate the First Amendment because 
the limits were narrowly tailored to address the state’s interest in preventing 
“distortion” of the political process by outsiders.81 Confusingly, the court 
held that preventing corruption did not justify Alaska’s law but that 
preventing “purchased or coerced influence” by nonresidents did.82 Overall, 
                                                                                                             
 76. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072 (2017) (providing the following limits 
per calendar year: $20,000 for gubernatorial candidates; $5,000 for state senatorial 
candidates; and $3,000 for state representative candidates and candidates for 
municipal or other offices). The law also limits the amount of contributions 
candidates may accept from nonresident groups. See id. (prohibiting candidates 
from accepting contributions from nonresident groups and prohibiting resident 
groups from accepting more than ten percent of their total donations from 
nonresidents). 
 77. See State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 600–02 (Alaska 
1999) (discussing the history of Alaska’s campaign finance reform). 
 78. Act of May 30, 1996, ch. 48, § 1, 1996 Alaska Leg. Serv. 1.  
 79. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 601. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. at 617 (upholding the law even though Alaska produced “no 
evidence relating to the potential impact” of out-of-state contributions); see also 
Hyman, supra note 61, at 1478 (explaining how the state supreme court had no 
problem validating the law once it determined the government interest was 
preventing outsiders from dominating the political process, because a law limiting 
nonresident contributions is clearly tailored to such an interest). 
 82. Compare Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 615 (“The State refers 
us to no specific evidence of corruption or the appearance of corruption caused 
by out-of-state contributions, and does not contend that quid pro quo corruption 
justifies these restraints.”), with id. at 617 (“Without restraints, Alaska’s elected 
officials can be subjected to purchased or coerced influence which is grossly 




the court appeared to recognize several other state interests as justifications 
for Alaska’s law.83 The opinion shows how government interests 
necessary to justify First Amendment infringement often overlap and can 
be difficult to distinguish.84 
The Alaska Supreme Court avoided the Ninth Circuit’s persuasive 
holding—an especially notable move because Alaska sits within the Ninth 
Circuit—by distinguishing Alaska’s law from Oregon’s.85 First, the court 
explained that Alaska’s law interfered less with the political association 
rights of in-state residents because the law’s limitation applied only to out-
of-state residents, not out-of-district residents who lived within the state.86 
Second, the court contended that Alaska’s law affected nonresidents less 
than Oregon’s because Alaska does not share a border with any other state.87 
When the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Alaska Civil 
Liberties Union,88 the Court left standing a nuanced distinction. On the one 
hand, state laws limiting the ability of in-state residents to contribute to 
candidates seeking statewide office in an election district where the residents 
did not live and could not vote were unconstitutional.89 On the other hand, 
state laws that limited the ability of all out-of-state residents to contribute to 
election campaigns in states where they did not reside were constitutional.90 
This distinction, however, did not last long.91 
                                                                                                             
disproportionate to the support nonresidents’ views have among the Alaska 
electorate, Alaska’s contributors, and those most intimately affected by elections, 
Alaska residents.”). The court did not explain the difference between “corruption” 
on the one hand and “purchased or coerced influence” on the other. See id. 
 83. See Hyman, supra note 61, at 1475 (identifying three broad interests 
recognized by the court: ensuring the integrity of the political structures and 
processes; preventing nonresident contributors from drowning out the voices of 
Alaska residents; and preventing distortion of public opinion). 
 84. See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 341, 387 (2009) (explaining several different concepts used by the Court to 
identify corruption). 
 85. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 616. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. The court did not provide further explanation about why Alaska’s 
isolation had less of an impact on nonresidents. See id. Presumably, the court 
assumed nonresidents had fewer interactions with, and interests in, Alaska 
because of its geographic segregation from the contiguous United States. 
 88. Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000). 
 89. See VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (invalidating 
Oregon’s nonresident contribution limits). 
 90. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597. 
 91. See Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2002) (invalidating Vermont 
nonresident contribution limits that applied only to out-of-state residents), rev’d 




3. Good Try, Vermont 
The most recent challenge to a state law that placed special limitations 
on nonresident contributions occurred in the early 2000s. Landell v. 
Sorrell involved a First Amendment challenge to a Vermont statute that 
prohibited candidates from collecting more than 25% of their campaign 
contributions from out-of-state residents.92 Like Alaska, Vermont created 
its nonresident contribution limits as part of broader campaign finance 
legislation.93 In particular, Vermont sought to limit large contributions 
from nonresident individuals and groups to “level the playing field”94 and 
encourage more residents to participate in funding election campaigns as 
a means of increasing “public confidence and the robust debate of 
issues.”95 The state’s nonresident contribution limits, however, did not 
withstand a First Amendment challenge.96 
Following the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit in Landell held that 
Vermont’s law was both overbroad and underinclusive as it related to the 
state’s interest in preventing corruption.97 The court described the statute 
as overbroad because it ultimately prohibited small contributions from 
nonresidents that likely would not lead to corruption.98 The statute’s 
underbreadth, meanwhile, stemmed from its failure to prevent corrupting 
contributions before a candidate reached the 25% ceiling.99 The Second 
Circuit found “no sufficiently important government interest” narrowly 
                                                                                                             
in part sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (reversing Second Circuit 
on other grounds). 
 92. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805 (repealed 2014), invalidated by Landell, 
382 F.3d at 98. 
 93. See Vermont Campaign Finance Reform Act, 1997 Vt. Acts & Resolves 
490, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/1998/acts/act064.htm [https://perma.cc/6ZJ4-
S6EU]; see also Landell, 382 F.3d at 99–102 (discussing the Act’s history and 
purpose). 
 94. “Leveling the playing field” involves preventing the speech of some 
people to promote, enable, or strengthen the speech of other people. At least one 
scholar equates “leveling the playing field” with equalizing otherwise unfair 
monetary advantages in the election process, analogizing the Court’s treatment of 
equality as a governmental interest in campaign finance to “Voldemort” in the 
Harry Potter series, “the idea that must not be named.” See Daniel P. Tokaji, The 
Obliteration of Equality in American Campaign Finance Law: A Trans-Border 
Comparison, 5 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 381, 381–82 (2011). 
 95. See Landell, 382 F.3d at 100. 
 96. Id. at 148. 
 97. Id. at 147. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 




tailored to support Vermont’s law.100 The court also questioned the 
reasoning behind the Alaska Supreme Court’s contrary ruling.101 Unlike 
the court in Alaska Civil Liberties Union, the Landell court did not find 
meaningful differences among Vermont’s, Alaska’s, and Oregon’s 
nonresident contribution limits.102 Although the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Landell, ultimately reversing much of the 
Second Circuit’s decision, the Court’s opinion did not address Vermont’s 
nonresident contribution limits.103 
4. An Island in Hawaii 
The United States Supreme Court has left open the possibility that 
nonresident contribution limits, at least in some cases, do not violate the 
First Amendment. Shortly after the Second Circuit’s ruling in Landell, 
Hawaii implemented its own nonresident contribution limits.104 Like 
lawmakers in Alaska and Vermont, Hawaiian legislators sought to justify 
the law by voicing their concern with outside influence in its governing 
process and elections.105 Although Alaska and Hawaii are the only two 
states with nonresident contribution limits, as long as the statutes exist, 
other states wary of increased outside influence could be encouraged to 
                                                                                                             
 100. Id. at 146–47 (“We find no support in the record for the alternative claim 
that Vermont has an important interest in singling out one class of contributors 
for limitations.”). 
 101. See id. at 148. 
 102. Compare State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 616–17 
(Alaska 1999) (distinguishing Alaska’s limits from Oregon’s), with Landell, 382 
F.3d at 147–48. 
 103. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
 104. H.R. 1747, 23d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2005), http://www.capitol.hawaii 
.gov/session2005/bills/HB1747_cd1_.htm [https://perma.cc/3PP7-NW3G]. The 
original statute, Hawaii Revised Statutes § 11-204.5, which since has been repealed, 
actually limited the amount of total contributions state candidates could collect from 
nonresidents to 20%. The 2010 amendments to Hawaii’s campaign finance laws 
increased the permissible amount to 30% of total contributions, but various 
legislative documents do not indicate the reason for the increase. See H.B. 2003, 
25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2010) (“The purpose of this part is to ensure the 
integrity and transparency in the campaign finance process . . . . Any ambiguity in 
the provisions of this part shall be construed in favor of transparency.”). 
 105. See J. 23-185, Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2005) (Conf. Rep.), http://www.capitol 
.hawaii.gov/session2005/commreports/HB1747_CD1_CCR185_.htm (“Restrictions 
on nonresident contributions will ensure that elected officials are not 
disproportionately influenced by outside interests.”) [https://perma.cc/9MSZ-
KQDN]. 




limit nonresident participation in their political process in similar ways. 
Recent activity in the United States Supreme Court, however, suggests any 
First Amendment challenge to a nonresident contribution limit would 
succeed. 
B. The Heightened First Amendment Protection of Political Spending  
A pair of recent Supreme Court rulings—Citizens United v. FEC106 
and McCutcheon v. FEC107—represent some of the most fundamental 
changes to campaign finance law in decades.108 Taken together, Citizens 
United and McCutcheon broadened First Amendment rights in the context 
of campaign finance restrictions and narrowed the government’s options 
when regulating campaign spending.109 Although neither decision directly 
addressed the constitutionality of state nonresident contribution limits, the 
Court’s rulings heightened the threshold a law must overcome when 
challenged on First Amendment grounds.110 
Citizens United, arguably the most famous Supreme Court decision in 
the past decade, established the Herculean strength of the First 
Amendment’s protection of campaign speech and association.111 The case 
involved a First Amendment challenge to federal laws that prohibited 
corporations and unions from making independent expenditures using 
their general treasury funds for express advocacy and “electioneering 
communications.”112 The Court ultimately invalidated the laws, rejecting 
the governmental interests of “leveling the playing field”113 and preventing 
                                                                                                             
 106. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 107. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 108. See GARRETT, supra note 12, at 2. 
 109. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434. 
 110. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434. 
 111. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372. 
 112. See id. at 320–21 (explaining that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(“BRCA”) of 2002 amendments to FECA created a prohibition on electioneering 
communication spending); see also 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A)–(B) (2012) 
(providing a statutory definition of “electioneering communication,” which 
generally includes any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that “refers to 
a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” made within 60 days of a general 
election or 30 days of a primary election). 
 113. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–50 (“[T]he concept that government 
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” (quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976))).  




“distortion”114 of the political process as insufficient to justify the burdens 
on political speech and association created by the laws. 115 In doing so, the 
Court indicated that preventing quid pro quo corruption likely was the only 
governmental interest sufficient to justify campaign spending limits.116  
Four years later, in McCutcheon,117 the Court confirmed what it hinted 
at in Citizens United.118 In McCutcheon, the Court invalidated a federal 
law that created aggregate limits on individual contributions to candidates 
for federal office,119 slightly weakening the previously significant distinction 
between speech protections afforded to contributions and independent 
expenditures.120 In sum, McCutcheon suggested that all political association 
limits not narrowly tailored to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its 
appearance violate the First Amendment.121  
After McCutcheon, the jurisprudence that would affect a First 
Amendment challenge to state nonresident contribution limits points 
decidedly in one direction.122 Alaska Civil Liberties Union stands as the 
lone exception to two federal circuit court rulings that invalidated such 
laws,123 and the Supreme Court has indicated in other recent campaign 
                                                                                                             
 114. See id. at 348–49 (identifying the antidistortion rationale as preventing 
“the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no 
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas” (quoting 
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990))). 
 115. Id. at 339–40. 
 116. See id. at 357–61. 
 117. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).  
 118. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 119. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442, 1462. 
 120. See id. at 1448 (“[T]he First Amendment safeguards an individual’s right 
to participate in the public debate through political expression and political 
association. When an individual contributes money to a candidate, he exercises both 
of those rights: [t]he contribution ‘serves as a general expression of support for the 
candidate and his views’ and ‘serves to affiliate a person with a candidate.’”) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15, 21–22 (1976))). 
 121. See James Bopp, Jr., Randy Elf & Anita Y. Milanovich, Contribution Limits 
After McCutcheon v. FEC, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 361, 395 (2015) (“McCutcheon not 
only substantially changes, but makes more rigorous the analysis used in challenges 
to regulations of contributions for independent spending and of direct contributions 
to candidates. Both types of contribution limits are likely unconstitutional under its 
framework.”). 
 122. See infra Part III. 
 123. Compare State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 617 
(Alaska 1999) (upholding Alaska nonresident contribution limits), with VanNatta 
v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1998) (invalidating Oregon nonresident 
contribution limits); Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 146 (2d Cir. 2002) 




finance cases the position it likely would take on the issue.124 An analysis 
of the constitutionality of nonresident contribution limits showcases the 
significant hurdles states would face in defending such laws.125  
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF NONRESIDENT  
CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 
The analysis to determine whether nonresident contribution limits 
violate the First Amendment involves a three-step inquiry. The first 
question is whether the law burdens political expression or association.126 
If it does, the second question is whether the state has a compelling 
governmental interest to justify the burden on activity protected by the 
First Amendment.127 Even if a compelling interest exists, however, under 
the third step, the state also must show that its law is narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest.128 The law violates the First Amendment if it burdens 
speech and the government either lacks a compelling state interest for the 
law or the law is not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s compelling 
interest. 
A. The Heavy Burden on Out-of-State Residents 
Campaign contributions represent an exercise of political expression 
and association rights protected by the First Amendment.129 Nonresident 
contribution limits create ceilings on the amount of contributions candidates 
may accept from out-of-state residents.130 Once the ceiling is reached, the 
law effectively bars nonresidents from making campaign contributions. 
Such a bar clearly burdens nonresident speech protected by the First 
Amendment. 
                                                                                                             
(invalidating Vermont nonresident contribution limits), rev’d in part sub nom. 
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (reversing the Second Circuit on other 
grounds). 
 124. See supra Part II.B. 
 125. See infra Part III. 
 126. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 
(2010).  
 127. See id.  
 128. See id. This standard of review often is referred to as “strict scrutiny.” 
See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 
(2000) (explaining that a law only passes “strict scrutiny” if it is “narrowly 
tailored to promote a compelling [g]overnment interest”). 
 129. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 
(2014). 
 130. See supra text accompanying note 53. 




In certain aspects, nonresidents deserve more political association 
protection than residents. Some courts, including the Supreme Court, have 
expressed sympathy for such an argument.131 Residents can always exercise 
their political power by voting, whereas no state allows nonresidents to vote 
in its statewide elections.132 Out-of-state residents, however, often have 
legitimate interests in the policies of other states.133 As political interests of 
Americans have become increasingly national in scope,134 with individuals 
                                                                                                             
 131. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449 (“The First Amendment burden is 
especially great for individuals who do not have ready access to alternative 
avenues for supporting their preferred politicians and policies.”); Landell v. 
Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 146–47 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that nonresidents have 
“legitimate and strong interests in Vermont and have a right to participate, at least 
through speech,” in the election process), rev’d in part sub nom. Randall v. 
Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (reversing the Second Circuit on other grounds). But 
see Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1978) (“[O]ur 
cases have uniformly recognized that a government unit may legitimately restrict 
the right to participate in its political processes to those who reside within its 
borders.”). The Court in Holt Civic Club held that residents of an unincorporated 
community could be subject to a neighboring city’s police and sanitation 
regulations, among others, by state statute even though they could not participate 
in the city’s political processes. See Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at 68–69.  
 132. See Voting by Nonresidents and Noncitizens, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG. 
(Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/non-resident-
and-non-citizen-voting.aspx (“No state has extended noncitizen voting to statewide 
elections.”) [https://perma.cc/HX3E-YYVD]. 
 133. See Todd E. Pettys, Campaign Finance, Federalism, and the Case of the 
Long-Armed Donor, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 77, 90–91 (2014) (explaining 
that because Americans are “highly mobile and are interconnected in countless 
political, economic, technological, cultural, and familial ways, it is vital that they 
remain free to speak and associate across state lines in order to shape political 
leaderships at all levels of government”). 
 134. See id. at 86 (“Cross-border political activity is a long-standing and 
growing feature of our political system.”); Dan Hopkins, All Politics Is Presidential, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 17, 2014, 5:38 AM) http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/all-
politics-is-presidential/ (“In recent years, gubernatorial elections have become 
increasingly nationalized, to the point where voting patterns in these races bear a 
striking resemblance to those in presidential races.”) [https://perma.cc/S2BZ-
GRM5]; Carl E. Klarner & Heather Evans, The Polarization and Nationalization of 
State Elections, 1971-2014, KLARNERPOLITICS, http://klarnerpolitics.com/uploads 
/3/8/5/0/3850983/featured_manuscript_-_klarner_politics.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 
2017) (“We also present evidence that state legislative and gubernatorial elections 
have become increasingly nationalized and thus more likely to be ignored by the 
electorate. This has presumably reduced the extent to which state elected officials 
are held accountable by citizens.”) [https://perma.cc/3RJ6-GBJT]; Jonathan M. 
Ladd, 3 Trends in This Week’s Elections: Biased Electorates, Nationalization, and 




often identifying more with a particular political party than with specific 
candidates or issues,135 nonresidents may seek to create political 
momentum for their parties or for candidates who share views on national 
issues similar to their own by supporting them in state elections.136 Any 
activities that have ripple effects in other states—for example, externalities 
associated with coal mining and production—represent especially ripe 
reasons for nonresidents to contribute to candidates who support their 
views in other states. Moreover, Americans who travel often to other states, 
whether for familial, business, or entertainment reasons, may have strong 
ties and associations in those states. People like Bill, the restaurateur, should 
at least be able to contribute money to out-of-state candidates to the same 
extent as in-state residents. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Citizens United rejected the idea that 
the government may impose political speech restrictions that discriminate 
based on the identity of the speaker instead of the substance of the speech 
involved.137 The Court stated, 
                                                                                                             
Redistricting Reform, VOX (Nov. 5, 2015, 2:10 PM), http://www.vox.com/mischiefs 
-of-faction/2015/11/5/9676268/redistricting-nationalization-elections (presenting 
elections of Kentucky’s governor and Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court as anecdotes to 
demonstrate nationalization of state elections) [https://perma.cc/F223-W6VW]; 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1135 (2014) 
(explaining how political engagement across state lines has “increased dramatically” 
in both federal and state elections in recent years). 
 135. See Brian Arbour, “All Politics Is Local”? Not anymore., WASH. POST: 
MONKEY CAGE (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/12/09/all-politics-is-local-not-anymore/ (explaining how the fate 
of Congressional campaigns depends more on the candidate’s party affiliation 
than anything else) [https://perma.cc/B8BV-JF4Z]. 
 136. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 134, at 1136 (identifying a handful of 
legitimate reasons nonresidents may want to contribute to state election campaigns 
in states where they do not reside). 
 137. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010) 
(“We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the 
Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history 
and logic lead us to this conclusion.”) (emphasis added); McCutcheon v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1461 (2014) (“For the past 40 years, our 
campaign finance jurisprudence has focused on the need to preserve authority for 
the Government to combat corruption, without at the same time compromising 
the political responsiveness at the heart of the democratic process, or allowing the 
Government to favor some participants in that process over others.”) (emphasis 
added); see also Michael Kagan, Speaker Discrimination: The Next Frontier of 
Free Speech, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 765, 766–67 (2015) (recognizing how 
Citizens United did not “invent” the idea that the First Amendment prohibits 
speaker-based discrimination, but “gave a new, clearer articulation to a principle 




By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the 
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right 
to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for 
the speaker’s voice. The Government may not by these means 
deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself 
what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration. The First 
Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow 
from each.138 
Although the Court in Citizens United suggested that the First 
Amendment forbids all speaker-based discrimination, the Court has, on 
many occasions, specifically allowed laws to burden the speech of some 
but not others.139 Therefore, this argument likely has limits. Still, any 
burden on political association that applies only to certain speakers—in 
this case, out-of-state residents—likely will not pass constitutional muster 
under the reasoning of Citizens United. 
In addition, nonresident contribution limits always exist in conjunction 
with limits on resident contributions. Nearly every state, including Alaska 
and Hawaii, limits the ability of all individuals, residents and nonresidents 
alike, to contribute to in-state campaigns.140 Because blanket contribution 
                                                                                                             
that had long been implicit and underappreciated in free speech jurisprudence”). 
But see Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause 
Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 448–49 (2013) (criticizing the Court’s application of 
the speaker-based discrimination principle in Citizens United and pointing to 
several situations in which the Court clearly allowed speaker-based discrimination 
in the context of First Amendment issues). 
 138. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–41. But see id. at 341 (identifying 
exceptional cases in which the Court upheld speaker-based restrictions that “were 
based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions”). 
 139. For examples, see McConnell, supra note 137, at 448–49. 
 140. See Contribution Limits Overview , NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG., 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaign-contribution- 
limits-overview.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6FMJ-PB86]; 
see also ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.070(b)(1) (2017) (banning all individuals, 
regardless of residency, from contributing more than $500 per year to a candidate 
or a group that is not a political party); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-357 (a)(1)–(3) 
(2017) (effectively capping contributions by individuals at $2,000 for candidates 
for state representative, $4,000 for state senators, and $6,000 for governors per 
election cycle). By comparison, California, New York, and Ohio each have 
contribution limits for individuals in the tens of thousands of dollars. Contribution 
Limits Overview, supra. Meanwhile, the following states do not place any limits 
on individual contributions: Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. 
Contribution Limits Overview, supra. 




limits already place a burden on the political association rights of out-of-
state residents, any additional restrictions further increase the interference 
with the constitutionally guaranteed rights of nonresidents, creating an 
unquestionably high burden on their political association rights. At 
minimum, additional nonresident contribution limits risk exacerbating the 
harms associated with suppressing political speech of people like Bill, the 
restauranteur, with legitimate stakes and interests in other states. 
B. No Government Interest Is Sufficient to Justify the Speech 
Suppression Created by Nonresident Contribution Limits  
When challenged on First Amendment grounds, laws can suffer 
constitutional deficiencies in two main ways. First, the government may 
lack a sufficiently compelling interest to enact the law.141 Second, even if a 
government has a compelling interest, the law may not be narrowly tailored 
to address the compelling interest.142 State nonresident contribution limits 
suffer shortcomings in both ways.  
1. Nonresident Contribution Limits Prevent Participation, 
but Not Corruption  
The Supreme Court has made it clear: a law interfering with 
Americans’ political association rights violates the First Amendment 
unless it is narrowly tailored to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its 
appearance.143 State laws that limit nonresident contributions, however, do 
little, if anything, to prevent the direct exchange of money for political 
favors.144 As two federal circuits have pointed out, such laws often are both 
overbroad and underinclusive.145 Even Alaska’s attorneys—who 
successfully argued that the state’s nonresident contribution limits did not 
violate the First Amendment—conceded that preventing corruption could 
not justify the state’s laws.146 
                                                                                                             
 141. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444 (2014) (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)). 
 142. See, e.g., id. 
 143. See id. at 1441–42. 
 144. See infra notes 149–51. 
 145. See supra Part II.A.1.–A.3. 
 146. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 615 (Alaska 1999) 
(“The State refers us to no specific evidence of corruption or the appearance of 
corruption caused by out-of-state contributions, and does not contend that quid 
pro quo corruption justifies these restraints.”). 




At best, the effectiveness of contribution limits as a legislative tool to 
prevent corruption is marginal.147 At worst, such laws actually may 
incentivize, rather than deter, corruption.148 At least one study found that 
campaign finance regulation has practically no effect on making the political 
process more democratic.149 Similar findings prompted Congress at one 
point to abandon contribution limits altogether,150 although the federal 
legislature eventually brought them back in response to the Watergate 
scandal.151 Particularly in an era of unlimited independent expenditures, 
the effectiveness of contribution limits likely will shrink even further as 
outside spending in state elections grows.152 In fact, the Supreme Court in 
Buckley foreshadowed this exact issue, hinting that contribution limits 
could become inappropriate if they began to impede the campaign process 
                                                                                                             
 147. See Gaughan, supra note 51, at 758 (asserting that contribution limits 
“have failed to advance the underlying policy goals of preventing corruption”). 
Some scholars have proposed abandoning contribution limits all together. See id. 
at 763. See generally John Copeland Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign 
Finance Legislation, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 69 (2000) (proposing to dissolve 
contribution limits and instead suggesting legislators recuse themselves from 
voting on issues that would affect their contributors directly). 
 148. See Philip M. Nichols, The Perverse Effect of Campaign Contribution 
Limits: Reducing the Allowable Amounts Increases the Likelihood of Corruption 
in the Federal Legislature, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 77, 118 (2011) (explaining how laws 
mandating a higher number of smaller contributions from a larger donor base 
increase the incentive to skirt the law all together and accept large contributions 
from fewer donors). 
 149. See Nemeroff, supra note 16, at 693 (noting how a study of election 
results between 1992 and 2004 indicated campaign finance laws neither level the 
playing field nor effect party control). But see id. at 691 (“Some studies have 
found that contribution limits do have a democratizing effect in that they reduce 
the average amount of each contribution and ‘level the playing field’ among 
various contributing groups. However, these studies did not find that contribution 
limits increased the number of contributors.”). 
 150. Id. at 696 (“Individual contribution limits were introduced in 1925, but 
were repealed when FECA was first enacted because the limits were ineffective.”). 
 151. See Smith, supra note 20, at 1055; see also GARRETT, supra note 12, at 3. 
 152. See, e.g., Liz Essley Whyte & Ashley Balcerzak, Outside Groups Playing 
Bigger Role in 2015 State Elections, CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Oct. 1, 2015, 
5:01 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/10/01/18074/outside-groups-
playing-bigger-role-2015-state-elections [https://perma.cc/2T3E-Z7B7]; J.T. 
Stepleton, Crossing the Line: Boosting Gubernatorial Candidates with Out-of-State 








they were meant to protect.153 Laws that do not serve their stated purposes 
cannot possibly be narrowly tailored to justify their existence.154 
2. The Court Could, but Should Not, Recognize Two Other 
Government Interests as Sufficient to Justify Nonresident 
Contribution Limits 
The only way nonresident contribution limits can remain constitutionally 
valid is if the Supreme Court expands the list of government interests that can 
justify campaign finance restrictions. Among the leading possibilities are 
preserving a representative form of government and maintaining federalism.155 
Despite the importance of both institutional fixtures of American government, 
such interests should not overcome the high bar protecting restrictions on 
political expression and association. Even though courts sometimes have 
used language indicating support for additional government interests in 
regulating campaign-related speech,156 the jurisprudence makes clear that 
such interests should not outweigh the First Amendment burdens created 
by nonresident contribution limits. 
                                                                                                             
 153. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (“Given the important role of 
contributions in financing political campaigns, contribution restrictions could have 
a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and 
political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”). 
 154. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1457 
(2014) (invalidating a “poorly tailored” statute). 
 155. See Pettys, supra note 133, at 91 (identifying “the self-governance 
rationale” as the governmental interest with the most promising possibility of 
justifying nonresident contribution limits); Garrick B. Pursley, The Campaign 
Finance Safeguards of Federalism, 63 EMORY L.J. 781, 823 (2014) (proposing 
that the Court recognize preserving federalism as a legitimate interest to regulate 
campaign finance). 
 156. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 
(2010) (“In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to 
make informed choices among candidates for office is essential.” (quoting Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 14–15 (implicitly recognizing the importance of representation))); 
Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 287 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“A 
State’s historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic 
political institutions [is] part of the sovereign’s obligation to preserve the basic 
conception of a political community.” (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 
295–96 (1978) (implicitly recognizing state’s interest in preserving representation), 
aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012))). 




a. Preserving Representation 
The United States Constitution guarantees a representative government 
to every state.157 But the Supreme Court has never recognized a state’s 
interest in preserving a representative or “republican” form of government 
to justify a nonresident contribution limit,158 even though similar interests 
have been recognized as compelling in other contexts.159 Perhaps the 
appointment of Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch—a replacement for the late 
Antonin Scalia—will shift the Court’s philosophical makeup such that 
representation could be recognized as a legitimate state interest sufficient 
to justify campaign spending restrictions in the future.160 After all, at least 
one retired Supreme Court justice, John Paul Stevens, believes the law 
should distinguish between campaign money spent by constituents and 
non-constituents,161 and Justice Stevens’s belief has doctrinal roots.162 The 
                                                                                                             
 157. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1 (“The United States shall guarantee to every 
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”). A “republican” form of 
government is a “government by representatives chosen by the people.” Republican 
government, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 158. See VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1217–18 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(rejecting the preservation of representation as insufficient to justify Oregon’s 
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 159. See, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 282 n.13 (1985) 
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 160. See Deborah Hellman & David Schultz, Foreword to Special Issue on 
Campaign Finance, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 207, 209–10 (2015–2016) (noting 
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soon could lead to a pro-democracy court); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 
396 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining that the recognition of nonresident corporate 
interests potentially in conflict with constituent interests could undermine 
representative democracy). 
 161. See Pettys, supra note 133, at 84 (quoting Justice Stevens as saying 
“[v]oters’ fundamental right to participate in electing their own political leaders 
is far more compelling than the right of non-voters such as corporations and non-
residents to support or oppose candidates for public office” (citing Dollars and 
Sense: How Undisclosed Money and Post-McCutcheon Campaign Finance Will 
Affect the 2014 Elections and Beyond, Hearing on Campaign Finance Before the 
Senate Rules and Administration Committee, 113th Cong., 3–5 (2014) (statement 
of retired United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens))). 
 162. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1; see also Deborah A. Roy, The 
Narrowing Government Interest in Campaign Finance Regulations: Republic 




Supreme Court, on occasion, has recognized a state’s interest in preserving 
republicanism even in opinions that ultimately found certain campaign 
spending limits violated the First Amendment.163 The Alaska Supreme 
Court, too, expressed in dicta its support for the belief that preserving 
representation justifies regulating campaign contributions.164 
Furthermore, one recent case hints that the Court eventually may 
recognize a state’s interest in preserving representation within the context 
of contribution limits. In Bluman v. FEC,165 the Supreme Court affirmed a 
lower court ruling that upheld the constitutionality of a federal law barring 
foreign nationals from contributing to domestic campaigns.166 The lower 
court reasoned that the federal government may exclude foreign citizens 
from activities “intimately related to the process of democratic self-
                                                                                                             
Lost?, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 39 (2015) (“The Government would fare better in 
defending campaign finance regulations if it began to build the foundation for a 
more compelling interest that is firmly embedded in the U.S. Constitution. And 
no interest is more firmly entrenched than the interest in preserving the 
representative democracy.”); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310, 449 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There are threats of corruption that 
are far more destructive to a democratic society than the odd bribe.”). 
 163. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976) (“To the extent that 
large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and 
potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy 
is undermined.”); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006) (“[T]he interests 
underlying contribution limits, preventing corruption and the appearance of 
corruption, directly implicate the integrity of our electoral process.’” (quoting 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003))); Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 339 (“In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the 
citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential.” 
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976))). 
 164. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 616 n.123 (Alaska 
1999), cert. denied sub nom. Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, 528 U.S. 1153 
(2000) (“The state’s power to preserve the political community by excluding 
nonresidents from voting is self-evident. Although we have not previously affirmed 
the authority of the state to limit the influence of nonresidents over state elections 
through regulation of their campaign contributions, such an extension would not be 
illogical.”); see also Hyman, supra note 61, at 1480 (explaining the difficulty of 
identifying the boundaries of various government interests but extrapolating from 
the state supreme court’s opinion that ultimately a combination of three were 
recognized: “leveling the playing field, protecting the republican form of 
government[,] and preventing corruption”) (emphasis added). 
 165. Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 
aff’d, 123 S. Ct. 1087 (2012). 
 166. Id. at 288. 




government.”167 Because of Bluman, at least two scholars have suggested 
that the Supreme Court may be willing to uphold out-of-state contribution 
limits against a constitutional challenge.168 
The same two scholars, however, ultimately concluded that Bluman 
probably was not significant enough to overcome other doctrinal and 
normative hurdles to the constitutionality of nonresident contribution 
limits.169 Most importantly, Bluman explicitly rejected an analogy between 
the relationship of foreign nationals to the United States and the 
relationship of American citizens to different states within the country.170 
Furthermore, Alaska Civil Liberties Union rests on questionable legal 
reasoning,171 VanNatta explicitly rejected the representation interest,172 
and McCutcheon rejected all governmental interests except preventing 
corruption as insufficient justifications for political association 
restrictions.173 The doctrine, therefore, strongly suggests that preserving 
representation cannot justify nonresident contribution limits. 
Other hurdles exist, too. Nonresident contribution limits aimed at 
reducing the influence of outsiders rest on the assumption that out-of-state 
donations to state candidates will result in the promotion of policy contrary 
to the interest of state residents.174 Many interests of nonresidents, however, 
likely align with resident interests. In the era of unlimited independent 
expenditures, many candidates for state office likely receive significant 
                                                                                                             
 167. Id. at 287. 
 168. See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 133, at 86; Bulman-Pozen, supra note 134, at 
1137–38. 
 169. See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 133, at 89 (“There are strong reasons to doubt 
that the Court would find that restrictions on out-of-state campaign spending can 
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 170. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 290. 
 171. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 615 (Alaska 1999) 
(“The State refers us to no specific evidence of corruption or the appearance of 
corruption caused by out-of-state contributions, and does not contend that quid 
pro quo corruption justifies these restraints.”). 
 172. See VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1217–18 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 173. See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441–42 (2014). 
 174. See Tyler S. Roberts, Note, Enhanced Disclosure as a Response to 
Increasing Out-of-State Spending in State and Local Elections, 50 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 137, 153 (2016) (identifying three main harms of nonresident 
political spending: drowned-out in-state political voices; favoritism by elected 
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support from super PACs funded in large part by nonresidents.175 
Nonresidents with legitimate local interests in other states could provide 
direct donations to candidates who want to protect local interests from being 
overshadowed by national agendas. Equipping candidates with more funding 
of their own, regardless of the source, may even strengthen the ability of 
candidates to represent their constituents. 
b. Maintaining Federalism 
In addition to protecting political representation, another government 
interest the Court could recognize to justify nonresident contribution limits 
is a state’s interest in maintaining federalism. Under a strong view of 
federalism,176 states serve as more effective “laboratories”177 for legislative 
experimentation if government representatives focus on local interests.178 At 
least one scholar has explained that the risks to federalism presented by 
increased outside spending are most severe in state elections.179 Further, 
because neither Alaska nor Hawaii shares a border with any other state, 
perhaps special geographic factors reduce the number of legitimate interests 
nonresidents have in those states. Such reasoning could explain the special 
discrimination against out-of-state residents under a strong view of 
federalism. 
Nevertheless, promoting federalism does not justify state nonresident 
contribution limits. First, the popularization of residency-based discrimination 
could encourage elected candidates and courts to substantiate state 
protectionism, potentially undermining a federal form of government.180 
Second, cross-border political participation actually emphasizes the role 
of states in the country’s political system.181 If states were politically 
                                                                                                             
 175. “Super PACs” are “independent political action committees . . . or other 
independent political advocacy groups that engage in campaign advertising but 
do not coordinate their expenditures with candidates or political parties.” 
Gaughan, supra note 51, at 759–60. 
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 177. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“It is one 
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 178. See generally Pursley, supra note 155. 
 179. See id. at 823 (“Political safeguards work only if states retain significant 
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 180. See Hyman, supra note 61, at 1481. 
 181. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 134, at 1142. 




irrelevant in the context of American government, nonresidents would 
have no reason to participate in the politics of other states.182 Finally, as 
Bill’s story demonstrates, geographic borders and physical distance do not 
significantly impede legitimate cross-border activity in a world where 
information travels nearly instantaneously and many people can afford to 
travel long distances within a short amount of time on a regular basis. The 
preservation of federalism, therefore, should not justify nonresident 
contribution limits that burden the political association rights of 
Americans who deserve the protections as much or more than in-state 
residents. 
IV. EXPLORING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES OF STATE LAWS 
RESTRICTING NONRESIDENT POLITICAL ACTIVITY  
The First Amendment likely prohibits states from placing special 
limitations on the ability of people to donate money to election campaigns 
in states where they do not reside.183 Undoubtedly, however, the First 
Amendment does not act as a bar on all state laws that burden 
constitutionally protected political activity by nonresidents. For example, 
neither the First Amendment nor any other constitutional provision prevents 
Texas from denying California residents the ability to vote in Texas 
elections.184 Alternatively, Florida certainly cannot ban a Georgian from 
vehemently endorsing a Florida gubernatorial candidate during barroom 
banter in Tallahassee. The interesting question, then, is determining where 
the constitutional divide should fall. When does the permissible 
preservation of a political community stop and the impermissible burdening 
                                                                                                             
 182. See id. (“The very fact that individuals from Texas seek to influence 
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 183. See supra Part III. 
 184. See, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 282 n.13 (1985) 
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of speech begin? To what extent may states exclude nonresidents from 
participating in their political process without violating the First 
Amendment?185  
This Comment does not answer these questions definitively. Instead, 
it gauges the appropriateness of applying the same constitutional logic that 
likely renders state nonresident contribution limits unconstitutional to 
other avenues of cross-border political participation. Donating money to a 
candidate’s campaign coffers is merely one of myriad ways that people 
can participate in state elections. Particularly zealous crusaders may 
volunteer to distribute campaign flyers, plant yard signs, or stuff mailing 
envelopes. Less ardent supporters may offer simply to put in a good word 
with their friends. The universe of potential campaign participation 
activities runs the gamut.  
Determining exactly when states may limit such behavior to their own 
residents without violating the First Amendment has proved tricky. One 
often-litigated example involves state laws that prohibit nonresidents from 
circulating ballot initiative petitions.186 As with nonresident contribution 
limits, courts are split on the constitutionality of such laws,187 and the 
United States Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue.188 For the 
most part, federal circuit courts have invalidated such laws on First 
                                                                                                             
 185. Residency-based discrimination by states also raises other constitutional 
concerns, such as equal protection and privileges and immunities. This Comment, 
however, focuses only on First Amendment issues. 
 186. Ballot initiative petitions, allowed by a handful of states, involve the 
process by which voters gather signatures in support of a law or constitutional 
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See Initiative and Referendum States, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG., http://www.ncsl 
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2002) (invalidating petition circulator residency requirement on First Amendment 
grounds), and Yes On Term Limits, Inc. v. Savage, 550 F.3d 1023, 1030–31 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (same), and Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (same), 
with Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Jaeger, 241 F.3d 614, 615 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(upholding petition circulator residency requirement against First Amendment 
challenge). 
 188. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 197 
(1999) (invalidating Colorado’s voter registration requirement for petition circulators 
but expressly declining to discuss the constitutionality of its residency requirement 
because it was not in dispute in the lawsuit). 




Amendment grounds.189 Although the courts uniformly found some 
version of protecting the integrity of the election process to be a 
compelling state interest,190 they also often found that states could not 
prove that residency requirements were narrowly tailored to prevent 
election fraud.191 In essence, as with nonresident contribution limits, the 
courts did not deny that states have an interest in protecting the integrity 
of their elections. The fatal flaw, instead, involved the states’ use of 
residency-based discrimination to achieve their goals. 
One of the cases in particular, Yes On Term Limits, Inc. v. Savage,192 
resulted in several noteworthy takeaways. In that case, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ultimately invalidated on First Amendment grounds an 
Oklahoma law banning nonresidents from circulating ballot initiative 
petitions.193 Even though Oklahoma presented evidence of fraudulent 
behavior by some nonresident petition circulators, the court held that the 
evidence failed to show that nonresidents “as a class” were more likely to 
engage in fraudulent behavior than residents.194 In addition, the court took 
the opportunity in a footnote to highlight alarming issues raised by 
Oklahoma’s proposed interest in restricting nonresident speech “simply 
because the speech may indirectly affect the political process . . . .”195 The 
court in Yes On Term Limits, Inc. continued, 
To accept the wholesale restriction of the petition process to 
residents of Oklahoma as a compelling state interest would have 
far-reaching consequences. For example, the prohibition of non-
residents from driving voters to the polls would seemingly be a 
logical extension. This court is unwilling to approve as a compelling 
state interest the restriction of core First Amendment rights in this 
manner.196 
                                                                                                             
 189. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
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The Tenth Circuit clearly placed more emphasis on protecting nonresident 
political participation than on Oklahoma’s desire to defend its defined 
political community, at least in the context of petition circulators.  
It requires no stretch of the imagination to apply similar arguments to 
protect other nonresident political activities. For example, the Tenth 
Circuit’s concerns in Yes On Term Limits, Inc. about “wholesale 
restriction”197 of nonresident participation in the ballot initiative petition 
process also apply to nonresident contribution limits that effectively ban 
nonresident donations once a candidate receives a certain threshold level 
of money from nonresidents.198 Residential voting restrictions should be 
able to preserve political cohesion sufficiently without help from unnecessary 
restrictions on nonresident political activity. A fine line exists between 
maintaining a political community and silencing speech as a form of political 
protectionism or isolationism. A defining principle of democratic institutions 
involves robust public discussion of political issues untethered from 
unnecessary government censorship.199 As one scholar wrote, 
The value of democratic legitimation occurs . . . specifically 
through processes of communication in the public sphere. It 
requires that citizens have access to the public sphere so that they 
can participate in the formation of public opinion, and it requires 
that governmental decision making be somehow rendered 
accountable to public opinion.200 
Some limits, such as residency-based voting restrictions, generally fit 
within the category of appropriate and constitutional residency-based 
political discrimination.201 Beyond that, however, the constitutionality of 
yet-to-be-challenged or perhaps even yet-to-be-created residency-based 
speech restrictions remains hazy. As with nonresident contribution limits, 
any state law that burdens nonresident political activity risks invalidation 
                                                                                                             
 197. Id. 
 198. See supra Part II. 
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under one of America’s most sacred societal and institutional values: free 
speech. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court, when given its next opportunity to do so, should 
invalidate state nonresident contribution limits. In today’s highly mobile 
society, nonresidents like Bill the restauranteur have many legitimate 
interests in states other than the one they legally call home. The First 
Amendment protects all Americans,202 and out-of-state residents deserve 
more, not less, political association protection than in-state residents.  
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